The Case for Iran or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb

Like everything in the Middle East, the politics are more complicated here than in other parts of the world and the stakes are far graver. The recent political changes brought on predominantly by the Arab Spring are nothing short of dramatic. Over the past 5 years there have been overthrown governments in Egypt (twice), Yemen (twice) and Tunisia; and ongoing civil wars in Iraq, Libya and Syria resulting in many thousands of deaths. President Ben Ali of Tunisia escaped into exile to Saudi Arabia while President Qaddafi of Libya wasn’t as fortunate. This is an unforgiving environment and there is little to no room for egregious errors.

Israel is a minuscule country surrounded by the aforementioned turmoil and to make matters worse, almost every other country in the Middle East would be happy to see Israel go gentle into that good night and even offer considerable assistance in that regard. The fact is that Israel is still facing, as it has faced throughout its entire existence, an existential threat to its very survival. For that reason the Israeli psyche is permeated with a strong urgency of living in the here and now, and thus long term planning is not one of our strengths. We may be the Start-Up Nation but we have no Intels, Apples or Googles simply because they require a significant long-term view. By the same token, there is also no subway in Israel’s largest metropolitan area of Tel Aviv (although Cairo and Tehran do indeed have a modern subway system).

Despite the numerous accusations to the contrary, I believe that PM Netanyahu’s trip to the US Congress is not motivated by political in-fighting or jockeying for more votes in the close upcoming Israeli election. For better or worse, PM Netanyahu has made the issue of the Iranian nuclear bomb a central tenet of his candidacy and term as PM because he earnestly believes that an Iranian nuclear device poses an existential threat to the State of Israel. Considering the dangers that lurk in this neighborhood and the margin of error, it is clear that PM Netanyahu is merely channeling the environment of which he is a product, and one cannot fault him for doing so. However, does this make him right?

Well, I don’t think so. It is clear that the Iranians will in fact obtain nuclear weapons in the very foreseeable future and nothing can stop them at this stage. Yet at the same time we must remember that Iran’s internal politics are as fractious and Byzantine as Israel’s. In Iran power is not concentrated in the hands of a single individual and Iranian politics has its share of conservatives (and ultra-conservatives) like the former President Ahmadinejad and liberals like the current President Rouhani, with a Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sharing effective power.

The Ahmadinejad years in particular have caused considerable economic loss and isolated Iran even further and President Rouhani is now trying to improve Iran’s economic plight by lifting the onerous sanctions. As such, Iran desperately needs this P5+1 agreement to succeed in order to improve its economic standing and bring much needed relief to the average Iranian citizen who are still suffering greatly under the weight of years of economic hardships, government mismanagement, cronyism and corruption, and economic stagnation which is set to get worse with the recent drop in oil prices that is central to the Iranian economy.

Yet what PM Netanyahu is forgetting is that while Iranian foreign and military policies do pose a risk to Israel and the Sunni-dominated Middle East, it does not pose an existential threat to Israel’s very survival. Iran is not seeking to annihilate Israel, not now or in the future, and it is certainly not suicidal. Iran does not even share a common border with Israel. This is not a band of crazy fanatics bent on destruction but rather an extremely conservative Shiite Muslim country that seeks to project itself militarily and politically in order to protect and strengthen its co-religionists in other parts of the volatile and Sunni-dominated Middle East.

Are Iranians and Israelis all going to sit down and sing Kumbaya anytime soon? Probably not in my lifetime, but more importantly, we need to step back and assess the Iranian nuclear bomb in the context of the current volatile Middle East where Iran is not necessarily Israel’s most pressing issue.

Return of the S-300 Saga?

Back in 2010 Russia tried to sell Iran and Syria the very capable S-300 mobile surface-to-air missile but was forced in the end to scrap the deal due to immense Western and Israeli pressure, which included a visit by the Israeli PM to Moscow to dissuade President Putin from doing so. The reason for all the hype was the fact that the S-300 was rightfully viewed as a game-changer that could potentially alter the regional balance of power.

The Russians tried unsuccessfully to argue then that since the S-300 was essentially an advanced air-defense system, it was therefore by definition a defensive weapon and thus should be exempt from all the hoopla surrounding the sale of the S-300. What really worried the Americans and Israelis was the fact that the S-300 was so advanced that it essentially provided an invisible umbrella capable of protecting Iranian and Syrian nuclear sites from any aerial attack. And I do mean any aerial attack, including those originating from aircraft, cruise missiles, UAVs, air-to-surface missiles – the whole enchilada. The S-300 were that good.

So why am I mentioning the old S-300 story from 2010? Well, because Reuters and TASS are reporting that the Russian company that manufactures the S-300 (Almaz, which has merged with Antey) is now offering a newer version of the S-300, called the Antey-2500, to Iran. The Antey-2500 (also knows as the S-300VM) is even more capable than the old S-300, possessing improved guidance radar, an ability to engage faster targets and a greater number of targets.

The Israelis in particular are worried about the presence of either air-defense system for the simple reason that Israel prides itself on its ability to control the skies of its Middle Eastern neighbors. Israel has hegemony of the skies over Lebanon and Syria (as well as Jordan and Egypt, although it respects the territorial integrity of the latter two) and often violates their airspace when Israel deems it necessary – when striking targets deep in their territory like the 2007 strike on the Syrian nuclear reactor in Operation Orchard or more recent strikes on Hezbollah arms depots in and around Damascus airport. Israel would like to preserve the current status quo and any change thereto worries Israel because it restricts their ability to surreptitiously deal with any potential threats to the State of Israel.

It is extremely difficult to send in a team of commandos to destroy a well-guarded site deep in enemy territory and there are many more factors that could go wrong (capture of soldiers, failure of the mission, etc.). Also, there is a greater degree of plausible deniability with an airstrike. In fact, the 2007 airstrike in Syria has never been officially attributed to Israel although it seems clear that Israel was responsible. However, this uncertainty was also important for the Assad regime since he could save some face.

Regarding the possible delivery of the new Antey-2500 to Iran, while the timing of the offer is quite odd coming on the cusp of the P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran (of which Russia is a member), I believe that news of the potential missile sale will not lead to another international brouhaha for the following reasons: back in 2010, the US administration was serious about the option of an Iranian strike being on the table, today that is no longer the case; current US-Israeli relations are at a nadir; and relations between the West and Russia have been seriously downgraded due to the Ukraine crisis and there is little that the West can pressure Putin with these days that it hasn’t already done.

It is also possible that once the imminent P5+1 deal is signed, the Iranian insurance plan against an Israeli strike comes in the form of the new Russian missiles. After all, it would be nearly impossible to carry out an aerial attack on Iranian nuclear sites with the new missiles in place.

So what does this mean for Israel in 2015? Well, it will probably depend on the outcome of the upcoming elections. If Isaac Herzog is elected Prime Minister, it is hard to imagine any attack on Iran would be forthcoming, regardless of whether new missiles are delivered or not, especially so early in his new term. The situation were Benjamin Netanyahu to be re-elected PM is more complicated. PM Netanyahu has made the Iranian nuclear threat to Israel such a central tenet of his candidacy and term as PM that it is hard to imagine him doing nothing on the issue.

The fact that PM Netanyahu could successfully carry out such a strike doesn’t necessarily mean that he should carry it out. Despite the now infamous Iranian comments about wiping Israel off the map, few Israeli military leaders actually believe Iran would ever seriously consider doing so. Why? Well, quite simply, Israel has a better insurance policy in place: it’s called a second-strike capability. It is no great secret that Israel’s Dolphin-class submarines possess that ability and that a few of them are always at sea. Let’s also not forget that Pakistan and India are both nuclear powers as well as bitter enemies who have fought numerous wars yet self-preservation and cool heads have managed to keep everything under control.

Will it be different between Iran and Israel should Iran finally join the nuclear club? Probably not. Will there be moments of political and military confrontation and brinkmanship? Sure thing, but let’s not kid ourselves into believing that the moment that Iran attains nuclear weapons they would start bombing Tel Aviv or shipping them off to Hezbollah with arming instructions on the back of a cereal box. That will not happen. Will it lead to more tension in the Middle East? Certainly. Will it lead to a new arms race here? Probably, but hey, this ain’t Wisconsin.

Israeli Elections and the Iranian Nuclear Bomb

Israel’s Hail Mary?

By Isaac Gerstman

Israeli elections for the 20^th Knesset and essentially for the next Prime Minister to lead Israel’s new government is hanging in the balance. Israel has long been split between along two main party lines: Likud and Labor. The former a conservative center-right leaning party that always aligns itself with many of the rightist parties and the latter a more liberal center-left leaning party that historically aligns itself with many of the parties on the left, including the Arab-bloc parties (who represent close to 20% of the Israeli Arab population). Initial polls show that the Labor and Likud are in for a close race.

Elections are in effect dominated by two central figures: Benjamin Netanyahu, who is running for his fourth term at the head of the Likud party, and political neophyte Isaac Herzog who is leading the current reincarnation of the Labor party together with Tzipi Livni. While I don’t intend to prognosticate about the possible outcome of the upcoming Israeli election, one thing needs to be taken into account: the possibility that PM Netanyahu will launch a pre-emptive attack on a few crucial nuclear sites essential to the Iranian nuclear program. I don’t think anyone in the West is deluding themselves into believing that the Iranian program can be halted or destroyed. This is not the Iraqi Osirak reactor of the 1980s, which was essentially a stand-alone unit. Iran has dozens of nuclear sites (reactors, enrichment sites, isotope separation plants and research facilities) many of them hardened from attack and/or buried underground behind formidable concrete walls. Some are even located in or near populated centers. Thus the possibility of destroying the program is little more than a pipe dream.

However, it is theoretically possible to buy some extra time by destroying key parts within the Iranian nuclear supply chain. By doing so, Israel (and the West) could possibly gain a few more years – perhaps as little as a year and a half – towards a hoped-for regime change in Iran. What with low crude oil prices exerting increasingly strenuous forces upon the current Iranian regime, there is a greater likelihood of such change appearing than there was in the past decade or so since the Iranian economy is extremely dependent upon its export-driven oil and gas industry, with Iran producing around 3 million barrels a day, making it the second largest OPEC producer.

If crude oil prices remain low ($40-50 p/b) it is possible that over time a regime change will occur, but it is not certain that such change will take place (if at all) before Iran succeeds in building its first few weaponized nuclear devices.

So where does this leave the present Israeli government run by PM Netanyahu? Israel and its allies have employed numerous tools from their impressive toolbox – many of them possessing unique and at the same time, Pandora Box-like qualities. Stuxnet, Duqu and Flame were the first manifestations of state-sponsored targeted computer viruses (STCV) to be used against specific countries as well as specific industries, with the intention of delaying the Iranian nuclear program and gaining insight thereto. So amongst the many assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists and mysterious explosions at related facilities, when Israel together with the USA, and Great Britain to a lesser degree, let upon the world the first STCV they actually let the genie out of the proverbial bottle by inadvertently sanctioning a new form of warfare much like the advent of the tank in WWI or the unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) firing a Hellfire missile in Afghanistan after 9/11. Ironically, North Korea, possibly with Iranian assistance, has successfully employed an STCV against Sony, exposing many trade secrets and unreleased films, as well as seriously embarrassing the company. Yet even earlier, a robust STCV was launched in 2012 against the Saudi Aramco company one of the largest companies in the world. It was believed that the attack was initiated by Iran and that Iran had acquired a budding expertise in STCVs from analyzing and developing defenses learned from...the Stuxnet STCV.

Iran has since been testing the defenses of other US based companies and government agencies for weaknesses to STCVs and is listed by US government agencies as being one of the leading STCV countries threatening the US (along with China and Russia). 

Regarding unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) it may surprise many to know that Israel is the unofficial inventor of the modern day unarmed drone. In fact, the UAV market which is valued at around $90 billion a year, is led by US and Israeli companies. Israel pioneered the military UAV market with the aptly named Pioneer, which was a small (200kg) reconnaissance drone that used a tiny piston engine first used, in its earlier form, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Israeli drones have developed along similar lines, invariably they are piston driven and while their size and more importantly, payload has increased they are still relegated to the lower tier of the market. UAVs are classified by their payload, endurance and attainable altitude. The smaller UAVs are used mostly for tactical reconnaissance on the battlefield, closing the gap between ‘sensor and shooter’ and are commonly integrated amongst the actual ground forces operating in the theatre. The medium-sized drones can fly much higher and longer, and carry a heavier payload, sometimes even armaments. The small and medium UAV market is dominated by Israeli companies (Elbit and IAI, in particular). Israel’s largest drone is the IAI Heron TP that can stay aloft for more than 72 hours, but like all the other Israeli drones is powered by a propeller-driven engine and is limited to a medium altitude (40,000 feet). Israel has extensively used the armed UCAVs of the smaller variety to carry out what are essentially small tactical strikes, often involving a single vehicle or house.

The USA on the other hand has taken the ‘higher road’ of developing larger drones, which have a heavier payload and greater reach. These drones are known as HALE UAVs for High Altitude, Long Endurance. The Global Hawk UAV can circumnavigate the globe on a single flight and can cruise at 60,000 feet, higher than the Heron TP. More impressive are the newer drones being developed by leading US defense companies, which are much faster, larger and stealthier. They would be the most lethal UCAVs ever developed. It is clear that instead of manned bomber airplanes, the future is rapidly moving toward UCAVs. In fact, the new F-35 fighter airplane, which is still being developed and won’t enter service until later next year will probably be the last manned fighter jet developed by the US.

A HALE UCAV capable of stealthily covering great distances (say to Iran and back) would ideally be at the top of Israel’s wish list. So where is Israel on developing these future fighters? Well, that is the million-dollar question. There are rumors that Israel has been developing a HALE for many years now but Israel has been suspiciously silent on the issue.

Is it possible that Israel has developed such a HALE UCAV? And if so, would Israel debut the new HALE UCAV on a secret mission to destroy key Iranian nuclear sites? An attack led by HALE UCAVs would be ideal for Israel because it would risk no Israeli servicemen or servicewomen; there is a greater degree of deniability for unknown aircraft that are destroyed bearing no identifying markings (if any fail to complete the mission); UCAVs could pull off aerial maneuvers that manned flights simply cannot (due to the limited G forces that pilots can withstand); UCAVs can employ ‘swarm technology’ whereby a lost unit on a particular mission can automatically be replaced by a redundant unit on a different mission belonging to the same group; and human error is much less a factor.

With the current nuclear talks between the US and Iran coalescing into a politically expedient agreement for both parties without addressing those local interests closely affected by the Iranian nuclear program, much to the chagrin of the Sunni-dominated Arab world and Israel, it is clear that now more than ever an Israeli government led by PM Netanyahu may be more inclined to carry out a daring and risky operation to set back Iran’s nuclear program perhaps by employing a yet newer form of warfare like multiple swarming UCAVs or a combination of UCAVs and manned fighter aircraft not because of local Israeli politicking but because PM Netanyahu may feel – much like PM Menachem Begin felt before ordering the Osirak attack a few weeks before the then elections – that the ‘dirty deed’ needs to be carried out and his successor may not have the stomach or wherewithal to launch such a daring operation. 


Thus, while an imminent Israeli ‘Hail Mary’ attack is not certain, the chances of it presently occurring have probably never been higher as they are now.

Iranian Movements on the Syrian-Israeli Border

Tit for tat

By Isaac Gerstman

Yesterday, January 28, 2015, a Hezbollah unit fired a Russian-made Kornet anti-tank missile at an Israeli convoy in the Har Dov region on the Israeli-side of the border with Lebanon killing a junior officer and his NCO. Surprisingly, the three ‘military’ vehicles were in fact regular-model vehicles being used by the military (the two soldiers killed were riding an Isuzu D-Max). Altogether, six Kornet missiles were fired by a small group of Hezbollah fighters lying in wait on the Lebanese side of the border with one striking a house in Ghajar. After the first missile struck the first vehicle killing both soldiers, the two other vehicles ground to a halt and all occupants jumped out and began returning fire as they ran for cover away from the vehicles that were subsequently destroyed by missiles.

The Defense Minister was left trying to explain why not one, but three regular ‘white’ vehicles (the army unofficially classes vehicles as being either ‘white’ or ‘green’, where white vehicles are for civilian-like uses such as logistics, transport, policing and green vehicles are strictly military vehicles such as Humvees, tanks or APCs) were driving along the Lebanese border at such a tense time. Defense Minister Ya’alon used outright sophistry when he responded that ‘even a fortified vehicle would not have helped protect the soldiers’. While it is true that the vehicle would have sustained significant damage, it is not certain that the occupants would have died. Moreover, a limited number of armored Humvees are now be equipped with the Israeli designed and fielded Trophy system that destroys anti-tank missiles before striking the vehicle.

So why were these vehicles struck? The vehicles were not really that close to the border as many had assumed. In fact, they were at least 3 kilometers away from the border and 4 kilometers from the Hezbollah fighters. The vehicles were travelling on a regular road open normally to civilian traffic but because of the tensions up north, there was a roadblock at which the army vehicles had to stop. Apparently, the Hezbollah fighters were waiting for an appropriate target (a stationary ‘white’ military vehicle fit the bill).

However, what Defense Minister Ya’alon might have said was: ‘it’s impracticable to close a 4 kilometer strip from the Lebanese border to only armored vehicles, especially in light of the fact that there are many communities within that area’. And he would have been right. On the map below the star represents where the Hezbollah missiles were fired and the black dot is the targeted Israeli convoy. Note the black Lebanese borderline in the upper left hand corner.

What next?

Mainstream news is replete with stories how Hezbollah has signaled through the UN that it has got its pound of flesh for last week’s strike on its people and that even the Israelis are looking to calm things down lest we find ourselves in another Lebanon war.

I believe that things will get worse before they get better. While it is clear that Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah have no interest in a large confrontation with a militarily superior Israel due to its commitments in Syria where considerable numbers of Hezbollah fighters, maybe three quarters of its operational force are actively fighting in Syria trying to prop up the Assad regime – and indeed turning the tide in its favor, Israel is dealing with a new challenge and change to the status quo which is likely to bring about further confrontation with Hezbollah and Iran within the Syrian sector.

New challenge

Israel has watched with trepidation as Syrian rebel groups, including the Al Nusra Front (an Al Qaeda offshoot), have pushed Syrian soldiers out of the Israel-Syrian side of its border. The Syrian-Israeli border has been the most peaceful border that Israel has shared with any Arab country for the past few decades, despite the fact that both countries are technically still in a state of war. Why? Because Assad senior and later Assad junior have taken pains to keep the border quiet and heavily mined. This has worked well for both parties, but with Assad junior loosing his grip on power, Syrian rebel groups have taken the area over and have also maintained a policy of non-confrontation. Imagine that. A zealously religious Sunni Arab group aligned with Al Qaeda is a stone’s throw away from the Jewish infidels and nary a stray bullet is to be seen. Odd? No. Machiavellian, yes.

Al Nusra have bigger fish to fry for now and are wholly focused on defeating the Assad regime together with other Syrian rebel groups who are their ideological antithesis (in fact the secular Free Syrian Army has been working with the Al Nusra Front in the Quneitra area). The Israelis are watching developments there with natural unease, but what has really alarmed the Israelis has been the arrival of large numbers of Hezbollah fighters fighting on the side of the Syrian regime together with IRGC assistance and forces against the predominantly Sunni-led rebel forces. To be frank, Israel would have preferred a stable Assad regime over sectarian rebel groups with their own parochial agendas, yet the thought of an Iranian proxy force unfettered by the powers that be in Lebanon is a nightmare scenario for the Israeli government. While Shite Hezbollah is a strong Lebanese political party with a significant military presence in Lebanon it is forced to share power with a large and more liberal Sunni faction and smaller Druze and Christian parties as well. A weak Assad regime with a strong Hezbollah force controlling the Syrian border with Israel would be under no such constraints and would be able to act more confidently against Israel then presently allowed under Lebanon. In essence, Iran would for the first time share a border with Israel and would be able to act with more freedom vis-à-vis Israel as well as other moderate Arab regimes.

What to do?

Israel will stop at nothing to keep this nightmare scenario from reaching fruition. Gen. Qasim Soleimani’s presence in Syria and Lebanon most probably involved the strengthening of Hezbollah’s grasp in Syria and particularly in western and southern Syria, those areas bordering Lebanon and Israel. As such, since Hezbollah and Iran are pushing forward towards strengthening their role in Syria they are on a collision course with Israeli policy of keeping Iran at bay, preserving a neutral Syrian border and maintaining its regional balance of power in its local backyard. If war should ever breakout in the area again, Israel would in a more precarious position in light of a dominant and independent Iranian/Hezbollah presence in Syria. Israel will act to redress the change in the balance of power. It may not result in any immediate action but I'm sure the Israeli Ministry of Defense is drawing up appropriate plans to ensure that Hezbollah does not get the upper hand in Syria. One of the key elements of such plan would undoubtedly be striking Hezbollah strongholds in Syria.

Welcome to Two Scouts

Thank you for visiting this blog dealing with geopolitical affairs in the Middle East.

Syria Strike - January 2015

By Isaac Gerstman

On Sunday, January 18, 2015, Israel launched a missile attack on a three-car convoy on the Syrian side of Golan Heights killing all the occupants. Israel has long been an ardent believer in carrying out helicopter-borne or more recently UAV-borne missile attacks on high-value moving targets. Obviously, the chances of collateral damage are greatly diminished and the possibility of verifying the presence of the particular target is greatly enhanced, whether through SIGINT, HUMINT and/or IMINT. However, the recent strike is unique even for Israel for a number of reasons, some of which carry geopolitical ramifications that might even risk a further conflagration in the ever volatile Middle East.

Mohammed Ali Allahdadi

Initially, Israeli news outlets followed by international news teams reported that the target of the strike was no other than Jihad Mughniyeh, son of the late Imad Mughniyeh, the arch-terrorist who was responsible for so many deaths and kidnappings in Lebanon, especially during the 1980s. 

What struck me right away was the fact that Jihad, who was only recently appointed a few months earlier by Hezbollah, was just 26 years old and with little to no operational experience. Despite being the darling of Hassan Nasrallah it beggars belief to think that the Israelis would risk an international operational strike in a neighboring Arab country for such a low-level target. While one Israeli newspaper pointed to the fact that Jihad's funeral was one of the largest in recent memory, attesting to his 'symbolic significance to the movement', I am quite confident that Israeli Military Intelligence was not looking for a symbolic victory when carrying out the strike. 

Also killed in the strike, aside from a number of bodyguards from Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp. ("IRGC"), was Mohammed Issa, a regional Hezbollah commander and Mohammed Ali Allahdadi, a general in the IRGC's Quds Force, an elite unit specialising in special operations outside of Iran.

Stating the Obvious

This was no run-of-the-mill tactical strike. Why? Because the strike was in Syrian sovereign territory; previous strikes in Syria (the 2007 nuclear reactor strike, May 2013 and December 2014 strikes on Damascus Airport warehouses) undoubtedly had the Israeli Prime Minister's approval; it is impossible to carry out a mission like this off-the-cuff since the organisational requirements to prepare such missions are onerous and time-consuming. The helicopter and UAVs reported in the area were not loitering looking for some fortuitous target to strike. This was a well-planned operation and all those killed were, at the very least, the intended targets. The real question is whether they were all the intended targets. While Gen. Mohammad Ali Allahdadi undoubtedly makes a tempting target for Israeli Military Intelligence, the geopolitical risks and ramifications of the strike in such a volatile region on one of the main political faultiness in the Middle East (where the borders of Lebanon, Syria and Israel meet) makes me wonder whether the real target was Mohammad Ali Allahdadi. 

It has been reported that no other than Gen. Qasim Soleimani, the head of the IRGC's Quds Force was in Lebanon at the time. Gen. Soleimani is one of the most important players in the Middle East and is single-handedly responsible for planning and implementing Iranian extraterritorial military policies, particularly in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The Jordanian Al Bawaba website claims that "informed Syrian sources" had told the Lebanese daily Al Akbar that Gen. Soleimani "stopped in Damascus about 10 days ago [on January 12th] on his way to Beirut to meet the leadership of the resistance". This would place Gen. Soleimani in Lebanon at the time of the strike. As such, it is reasonable to assume that Gen. Soleimani, Hassan Nasrallah and Mohammad Ali Allahdadi had all met in Beirut. Perhaps the Israelis were hoping that Gen. Soleimani himself was part of that convoy - inspecting positions just as Gen. Soleimani had inspected in Syria and Iraq as part of the IRGC's efforts against ISIL, which had been heavily reported in both the Iranian and Arab press as well as in the Western press.

In any event, one thing is certain. Hezbollah and Iran will be forced to retaliate. While Hezbollah would like its pound of flesh, Iran will be extremely careful to ensure that any such retaliation by Hezbollah does not lead to an all-out confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel. Border skirmish yes, war no. 

Iran on the other hand will be looking to exact its revenge on a different front altogether. Either way, it is not in Iran or Hezbollah’s interest to open a new front with Israel due to their commitments fighting ISIL and Syrian rebels in Syria and combatting ISIL in Iraq.